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ABSTRACT 
I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks 
introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an 
uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would 
compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of 
reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality 
of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman’s own terms. 
 1. Introduction 
 
The aim of our modified version of Kantianism […] has nothing to do with certainty 
or epistemic security at all. It aims, rather, at precisely […] universal rationality, as 
our reason grows increasingly self-conscious and thereby takes responsibility for 
itself. (Friedman 2001, 68) 
 
Such are the last sentences of Michael Friedman’s Kant Lectures published as Part I of the 
fittingly titled monograph Dynamics of Reason. They make admirably clear what is at 
stake for Friedman: he sees it as philosophy’s responsibility to speak up for reason, and to 
uphold Enlightenment values in the face of a “widespread relativistic tide” (Friedman 2001, 
57). In mounting his sophisticated defence of rationality he tries to offer a way out of the 
incommensurability conundrum bequeathed to philosophy of science by the work of 
Thomas Kuhn, but he also explicitly denies that his specific way of defending the 
rationality of paradigm-changes would commit him to scientific realism (ibid., 117). This 
denial might be seen as creating an uneasy tension in Friedman’s position, though (as 
argued, e.g., by Slowik 2006), since he stresses the convergence of succeeding paradigms 
as an essential part of the paradigm-transcending rationality. But belief in such 
convergence is something that is typically underwritten by realist commitments: why 
would one expect it, if not because one believes that our scientific methods allow us to 
learn something about the true structure of the world? And it is a striking feature of 
Friedman’s presentation that he actually doesn’t seem to offer much of an argument for 
this convergence: he only introduces the historical fact that it is possible to notice a kind of 
convergence from the Aristotelian to the Newtonian to the Einsteinian space-time theories, 
which in itself obviously cannot suffice to believe that this will continue to hold true. So, is 
he implicitly endorsing scientific realism in stipulating the continuing convergence? And if 
he is not, what sense can we make of his stress on the necessary convergence? A careful 
consideration of these questions might help us to reach a better understanding of the 
precise nature of Friedman’s defence of universal rationality. It will turn out that we should 
 take his summary in the opening quote more seriously than most people might be tempted 
to do. 
 
2. The Relative A Priori and the Dynamics of Reason 
 
Friedman is probably best known for his forceful reintroduction of the notion of 
constitutive, a priori principles in contemporary philosophy of science. Taking his lead 
from Hans Reichenbach’s early work he argues that Kant’s views on the a priori 
prerequisites for natural science still hold promise if we distinguish between on the one 
hand the constitutive role of a priori principles, and on the other hand their supposed 
unrevisability. He stresses that a detailed analysis of the structure of Newtonian mechanics 
and special and general relativity shows that we should discern three different layers within 
these theories. On a first level we have purely mathematical structure (e.g. Euclidean 
geometry and calculus for Newton’s theory); on a second level we have a special class of 
principles, which allow the coordination of mathematical structures with empirical 
phenomena (e.g. Newton’s three laws of motion, which allow one to identify the inertial 
frames of reference in which one can then first unambiguously relate mathematically 
characterized paths of motion to their empirical counterparts); and on a third level we have 
the theory’s properly speaking empirical laws (e.g. the law of universal gravitation).  The 
most important point about this layered structure is that the different levels have an 
epistemologically asymmetrical function: the first two levels first allow us to ascribe truth 
values to the empirical claims of the theories, and thus are constitutive with respect to the 
third level. This asymmetry also implies that it makes no sense to think that the constitutive 
principles themselves could be tested empirically, since all meaningful empirical tests must 
already presuppose them. But this does not imply that for that reason they would be 
unrevisable, as the historical progression from the Newtonian to the Einsteinian space-time 
frameworks forcefully makes clear.  
This does imply, however, that we are once again confronted with the spectre of radical 
incommensurability, as it is no longer clear how we can rationally decide to switch 
constitutive principles: it seems that that these principles in the first place make possible 
 rational agreement, because they first constitute what Friedman calls “the empirical space 
of reasons” (ibid., 85). But this problem, which arises exactly because we can no longer 
hold on to Kant’s belief in the absolute unrevisability of constitutive principles, can be 
overcome by paying attention to another distinctively Kantian insight, Friedman claims. 
Kant’s keen analysis of the crucial role of constitutive principles was only possible because 
of his specific understanding of the task of philosophical analysis vis-à-vis scientific 
practice. He saw that the most fruitful position for philosophy was that of a 
“transcendental” meta-discipline which critically investigates the presuppositions of 
science. Putting metaphysics on the sure path of science implied giving up the false idea 
that philosophical analysis could proceed independently from science to give the latter its 
true foundations, but also resisting the idea that it had to be conceived as an extension of 
scientific insights to a further, supposedly meta-physical domain. And it is exactly 
philosophy considered along these lines that historically provided the resources to make 
paradigm-change intelligible and made it possible to switch constitutive frameworks 
through a process of consensus-creating reasoned argumentation.  
Friedman argues for the latter point along two lines, with the first taking clear 
predominance: he first presents a subtle historical narrative, and he then gestures towards a 
philosophical argument. The historical story explains in convincing detail how Einstein’s 
revolutionary moves were only possible because of his engagement with the philosophical 
debates on space-time that crucially included Helmholtz and Poincaré. And these 
philosophical debates in turn were a direct outcome of a critical investigation of Kant’s 
transcendental analysis of the conditions of possibility of (applied) mathematics. Side by 
side to the successful application of the Newtonian framework to ever more empirical 
phenomena (the Kuhnian process of normal science) was developing a lively dialogue on 
the “quid juris” of this framework, a dialogue which was initiated by Kant’s own analyses 
but further informed by developments internal to these mathematical and empirical 
sciences (just as Kant’s views were informed by the state of these sciences at his time). 
And it are these philosophical reflections which as “philosophical meta-paradigms or meta-
frameworks” play “an indispensable role, by serving as source of suggestions and guidance 
– for orientations, as it were – in motivating and sustaining the transition from one 
 paradigm or conceptual framework to another” (ibid., 46). Einstein could only have made 
his revolutionary moves because he operated against this level of philosophical meta-
reflection; and exactly because his moves had this background, they had to be taken 
serious and considered as live options in the science of his days. In the place of an 
empirical testing of the constitutive principles comes a sustained philosophical inquiry of 
their right to claim special status, which in the right circumstances (Kuhnian crisis) can 
help open up the conceptual space for the crafting of a new “empirical space of reasons”. 
Kuhn’s views on history of science only raise the spectre of irrationality because they 
unduly neglect the parallel evolutions in history of philosophy. 
In arguing for this point of view, Friedman introduces the notion of “communicative 
rationality”, which he takes over from Jürgen Habermas (ibid., 53ff). This notion is 
intended as an articulation of the Enlightenment faith in human rationality, by offering the 
ideal of “non-coercively uniting, consensus creating power of argumentative speech” 
(Habermas, quoted in Friedman 2001, 54). And this is exactly the kind of rationality that 
not only characterizes normal science (due to a shared empirical space of reasons), but also 
paradigm-change (due to the presence of philosophical meta-paradigms sustaining well-
articulated “argumentative speech”). Conclusion: we can still uphold our best 
mathematical sciences as exemplars of human rationality.  
It is after having added historical evidence that we can indeed describe paradigm-changes 
as communicatively rational, that Friedman adds that, “from a philosophical point of view”, 
“we can thus view the evolution of succeeding paradigms or frameworks as a convergent 
series, as it were, in which we successively refine our constitutive principles in the 
direction of ever greater generality and adequacy” (ibid., 63). This claim is backed up by 
historical evidence (the possibility of retrospectively approximating features of the old 
framework within the new one, and the possibility of “prospectively” seeing the new 
framework as arising out of the old through a continuous development – a continuity only 
made possible by the philosophical meta-framework, of course), but as already indicated in 
the introduction, its scope is actually much wider than can be established by purely 
historical evidence and the latter must thus be supplemented by philosophical 
argumentation – as Friedman himself indicates by introducing it as following “from a 
 philosophical point of view”. This is further underscored by his switch to explicitly 
normative language in repeatedly stating that we should always be able to view paradigm-
change in this way. These strong statements are backed up by an appeal to Kant’s 
conception of the regulative use of reason, which offers an ideally completed state of 
scientific progress as a focus imaginarius guiding all empirical research (cf. also Section 
3.2 below), but which Friedman now extends to also make possible “trans-historical 
universality” within the domain of shifting constitutive principles. This idea is inspired by 
Cassirer’s way of rethinking Kant’s transcendental idealism in the light of revolutionary 
changes, but Friedman stresses that, more than Cassirer, he still wants to leave room for 
relativized constitutive principles within this ideal progression (ibid., 66, fn. 80) – 
providing temporary points of rest as it were. 
But why exactly do we need this regulative use of reason in our defence of rationality? At 
this point Friedman is disappointingly vague. It would seem that the appeal to 
philosophical meta-paradigms already does the job of securing communicative rationality, 
in offering the possibility of coming to reasoned intersubjective agreement. Why does he 
want to add an appeal to an ideal of reason as giving extra, “trans-historical” direction to 
this process of argumentative deliberation? I think that a glimpse of the largely hidden 
motivation can be seen in the way Friedman introduces a summary of his views with the 
question: “how … can the proposal of a radically new conceptual framework be … both 
rational and responsible?” (Ibid., 66; my emphases.) But by thus indicating that reasoned 
intersubjective agreement might not be enough for fully universal rationality, this extra 
appeal to “responsibility” could lead us back to the suspicion that this hidden motivation is 
actually one of a kind with scientific realism – as realists typically portray it as the 
responsibility of scientists to uncover the world’s true structure, which true structure would 
then ground the convergence of scientific theories. As already mentioned, it is clear that 
Friedman himself does not intend his argument in this way, as he explicitly warns us that 
his views on the necessary convergence of successive frameworks must not be understood 
as “ever better approximations to a radically external world existing independently of the 
scientific enterprise itself”, since the “original Kantian conception of objectivity … was 
explicitly intended to undermine such a naively realistic interpretation of scientific 
 knowledge” (ibid., 67). If we thus want to come to a better understanding of Friedman’s 
possible agenda in stressing the need of “responsible” paradigm-change – and especially its 
relation to the series of converging frameworks – we must start by taking a closer look at 
this original Kantian conception of objectivity and its possible relation to present-day 
discussions on scientific realism. This will prove to be especially interesting because we 
will see that Kant’s own appeal to the regulative use of reason is closely connected to some 
of the issues that are at stake in these discussions. 
 
3. Transcendental Idealism and Scientific Realism 
 
In the following I will propose a reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism which has to 
meet two constraints: it should be formulated at high enough a level of abstraction, such 
that it also can be used in helping to characterize Friedman’s position (this implies 
remaining as uncommitted as possible on the vexed issue of the status of a priori forms of 
sensibility – Friedman definitely owes us further clarifications about the position such 
forms occupy in his modified Kantianism); and it should be a reading which fits 
Friedman’s claim that being Kantian implies not being a scientific realist. 
 
3.1 The Transcendental Stance 
 
One way to understand Kant’s transcendental idealism is seeing it as the outcome of a 
decision to take at face value the fact that we, human beings, have to think in confronting 
reality – and to let this fact provide its own norms in our philosophical views on this 
confrontation.1 Let me try to unpack this rather cryptic statement a bit. All classical (i.e., 
transcendentally realist) metaphysical positions have started from the supposition that 
reality has a determinate structure and that we must thus judge our knowledge by trying to 
                                                 
1
 Kant-interpretation is of course a lively philosophical field in its own right, and I have neither the space nor 
the intention to defend my particular understanding in any detail here (but for the fact that it should meet the 
two constraints just mentioned). Let me just point to Allison 2004 and Longuenesse 1998 as two important 
works which have greatly influenced my reading of Kant. 
 assess how it fares in bringing this structure to light. But ascribing a determinate structure 
to reality is of course already the result of an act of thinking, whereas this structure is 
supposed to be completely independent of all human activity. Rather than deciding with 
the rationalists that reality in itself must already have an intellectual structure (a conclusion 
that is traditionally backed up by an appeal to God), or with the empiricists that we can 
never apprehend this independent structure (exactly because we are always forced to think), 
transcendental idealism decides to turn philosophical reflection away from this postulated 
structure and direct it on precisely the human acts of thinking which first allow determinate 
structures to have sense for us. Reflecting on what it means that structures can have sense 
for us implies that we have to ask what it actually means to be thinking about something, 
which then brings us to the central Kantian question: how does our thinking relate itself to 
its objects? The answer consists in noticing that this relation is (and can only be) brought 
about by presupposing certain (“objectivating”) conditions which then allow us to 
recognize and re-identify objects under (universal) concepts. Thinking posits its own 
norms (the categories) by which any human can transcend her particular subjective 
perspective and relate this to an objective world shared by all human beings. And it is 
because of this norm-bound activity that we are first able to judge on the truth and falsity 
of empirical claims referring to this objective world – which is why Kant calls his 
transcendental analysis of these norms a “logic of truth” (A63/B87). And it is the decision 
to take the functioning of these norms seriously which then brings the transcendental 
idealist to the view that it literally doesn’t make sense to ask what structure the world 
would have in itself, independently of our human way of knowing it: this is simply not the 
right kind of question. 
In stressing the fundamental decision lying behind transcendental idealism I follow Henry 
Allison in construing it as a philosophical stance. But it is important not to loose sight of 
the fact that this stance has important “metaphysical” implications. Most important among 
these is the absolute primacy of form over matter, which follows upon the highlighting of 
the necessity of a priori conditions in our cognitive approach towards the world. There 
simply are no facts of the matter independently of our cognitive activity which first allows 
us to ascribe structure to the world. It is important that this does not imply that the 
 cognitive norms governing this structure-constituting activity would be arbitrary for that 
reason, as is shown by the transcendental deduction in which Kant proves their right to 
normative status by grounding them in the transcendental unity of apperception. It is of 
course impossible to enter here into the intricacies surrounding this proof, but it might be 
useful to recall that its kernel consist in the fact that the categories are shown to be 
indispensable to the constitution of a unified experience – they reflect acts of providing 
necessary unity to the merely given and as such indeterminate sensations. 
There is one more aspect about Kant’s transcendental idealism that will turn out to be 
relevant, and this concerns the thorny issue of “the thing in itself”. On Allison’s one-world 
account (which is explicitly endorsed in Friedman 1996, 441, n. 18) it is stressed (1) that 
talk about “things in themselves” does not refer to a separate class of putative entities 
which would be radically different from the mere appearances which are subject to our 
cognitive activity; and (2) that such talk is an unavoidable and necessary consequence of a 
transcendental perspective. Since in occupying such transcendental perspective a 
philosopher reflexively isolates our necessary cognitive contribution in confronting objects 
in the world, this implies a different (distinctively philosophical) way of considering these 
same objects than in our natural empirical considerations. And because of this reflexive act 
of isolation it must also be possible to bracket these constitutive conditions and refer to 
these objects as they are when considered independently from all constitutive conditions. It 
must be stressed immediately that such a consideration must remain void of cognitive 
content – we cannot genuinely think about objects when we consider them in this way, but 
for the indeterminate thought of an object in general. But it is not insignificant for that 
reason, because in doing so we highlight the fact that not their existence, but only their 
existence as objects depends on us: our knowledge of the world is grounded, but not in 
determinate things independent from our approach to them. And this must stand as a 
warning against the illusions with which metaphysical realism presents us (which includes 
the trap of subjective idealism). We can add that the mere possibility of this dual 
consideration also teaches us something else of further significance: that our cognitive 
approach to things, although not arbitrary, does have an essential element of contingency – 
determined by the kind of (finite) human beings we are. 
  
3.2 The Regulative Ideal and Scientific Realism 
 
By now I can be rather brief, as the most important point has already been established in 
pointing out the metaphysical implication of the transcendental perspective. Since the 
metaphysical assertion “that the world has a definite and mind-independent natural-kind 
structure” is supposedly “a basic philosophical presupposition of scientific realism” 
(Psillos 1999, xix), Kant can apparently not be counted among the scientific realists 
(although it must be said that the use of “mind-independent” can be ambiguous, as Kant 
certainly is not a subjective idealist who believes that empirical reality is a product of our 
minds – a more careful formulation might be to speak about standpoint-independent 
structure). This is also all that Friedman seems to have in mind when he offers his curt 
dismissal of realism. We can say a bit more about the relation of transcendental idealism to 
the contemporary discussions on scientific realism, though; and this will prove relevant in 
assessing Friedman’s convergence claims.  
Scientific realists typically believe in the convergence of scientific theories to an accurate 
account of the true structure of the world because they hold on to some variant of the no-
miracle argument (cf. Slowik 2006, who claims that Friedman’s claims about convergence 
can only be intelligible when underwritten by this argument), but appeal to this argument is 
of course ruled out by the transcendental idealist stance: the idea that we could explain the 
success of science by its approximately mirroring the true and determinate structure of the 
world, where the latter is independent of all (scientific) theorizing, is just a vestige of 
transcendental realism. But what is more important, for Kant there is also no reason why 
we should explain the success of science along these lines, since he has an alternative on 
offer. First, we have a constitutive framework which allows us to come to objective 
knowledge. Second, we have the regulative ideal of reason which directs us towards a 
progressive theoretical determination and unification of all aspects of reality – we make 
progress in science because that is what we actively have to search for.  This is of course 
not an “explanation” that would satisfy the realist, which is only to be expected as Kant 
denies all sense to such explanation by (what for him must be void) postulation. But seen 
 from the transcendental perspective it does show something relevant about what it is about 
science that brings people to think that we need to, or even could give such explanation. It 
is this regulative ideal of reason, actually a projected rather than given unity (a focus 
imaginarius), which through hypostatization fosters the illusion that reality would actually 
exist as completely and systematically determined; and Kant’s claim on the unavoidability 
of the transcendental illusions of reason can thus also explain the pull that realism 
continues to exert.  
It is important to point out that Kant explicitly warns against interpreting this regulative 
ideal as merely a heuristic or methodological device (e.g. A653/B681 – a passage that 
serves as motto to Friedman 2001): without it we could not even coherently use the 
understanding, and thus would not be able to ascribe empirical truth to any statement 
(A651/B679). How this is to be understood in detail is at least as much a matter of 
contention as any other claim in the Kantian corpus, but I think we can at least distil the 
following. The understanding, which is the faculty that forms concepts reflecting objects 
does so with an eye to finding unity in experience (it is driven to do so by its own 
immanent norms, cf. the transcendental deduction), but in doing so it cannot look beyond 
what is actually given to it in actual perception (which is basically a form of the problem of 
induction). The faculty of reason must thus assist the understanding through its ability to 
integrate different concepts; and the only way that this can actually help us to go farther 
than what perception can directly teach is by effecting this integration under the regulative 
ideal of complete systematicity in nature (i.e. allowing only “projectible” predicates as 
concepts, by necessarily interpreting observed order as belonging to larger, ideal structures 
of order).  
There are two things of immediate importance to note: the regulative ideal of reason is 
dependent on the constitutive principles of understanding for its operation; but it 
nevertheless has an a priori normative force of its own (as is the case for the constitutive 
principles, systematicity could also never be empirically falsified) which is again grounded 
in the possibility of unitary experience (rather than in meta-physical beliefs about the 
“true” structure of the world), i.e. in the possibility to use our understanding in forming 
truth valued statements about an objective reality.  
  
4. Reason’s Responsibility 
 
In sketching this background to Friedman’s denial of scientific realism, we have actually 
gathered the elements which will now allow us to diagnose what seems to be a fatal 
ambiguity in his characterization of inter-paradigmatic rationality through the idea of a 
convergent series of constitutive frameworks, guided by a regulative ideal of reason. It is 
not that such an idea would commit him to realism, as his reference to the Kantian 
pedigree of his position is indeed enough to ward off such suspicion. It is rather the idea 
itself of having a series of constitutive principles being guided by a regulative ideal which 
does not make sense when seen from within this Kantian perspective. 
We have seen that in Kant’s system, the regulative ideal of reason is indeed genuinely 
normative – and thus a candidate to ground communicative rationality – but we have seen 
that it is also dependent on a constitutive framework within which the ideal can further 
guide the understanding. In Cassirer’s modified version of Kantianism, which Friedman 
cites as the important source of inspiration for his own views, this dependency is exactly 
inversed. The regulative ideal of systematicity takes absolute precedence, and a 
constitutive framework can only be defined as the set of principles which turn out to be 
preserved in the progress from theory to theory towards the projected complete system, and 
which as such are the conditions of every possible theory. But what about Friedman’s 
proposal? At any stage of development in a mature physical theory we do have a set of 
constitutive principles which determine the space of reasons and allow us to form truth 
valued statements about an objective reality. Within any such framework it makes sense to 
project the ideal of nature as a fully unified system, but what kind of unified world could 
be “trans-historically” projected to span all these frameworks? Empirical truth makes sense 
only within a constitutive framework (it is this possibility which grounds the latter’s 
special status), so speaking about the truth of the changing frameworks is precisely what 
cannot make sense (also according to Friedman (ibid., 118)) – but as our exposition in 
Section 3.2 should have made clear, this also takes away the ground under the 
transcendental justification of the normative status of the Kantian regulative ideal. The 
 basic problem is that both Kant’s and Cassirer’s regulative ideal plays a role in (further) 
articulating what is ultimately one empirical space of reasons, and that it is not clear what 
sense it makes to speak about “convergence” of synthetic structures in the absence of such 
unitary empirical world – whether this would be interpreted realistically or 
transcendentally. I already noted in Section 2 that Friedman gestures towards an argument 
rather than really providing one when introducing his normative remarks on the 
convergence of frameworks. It now seems that he actually gestures in the wrong direction. 
It is probably for this reason that, notwithstanding his stress on the convergence of 
frameworks, Friedman at one point also speaks about “approximation to a final, ideal 
community of inquiry” (Friedman 2001, 64, my emphases). Such an ideal community 
would have “achieved a universal, trans-historical communicative rationality on the basis 
of … fully general and adequate constitutive principles” (ibid.) – but securing this kind of 
rationality is of course exactly what Kant himself believed he had achieved!  
I suggest that we thus better understand Friedman’s view on what can secure the ultimate  
rationality of paradigm-change as a very serious call to uphold the full promises of the 
Kantian philosophical project itself – but as exactly that: a project. The only reason we 
have for positing convergence comes from the fact that it always is (and arguably must 
remain) a projected ideal: it is not a point we need to believe will ever be reached by any 
human community of inquiry (and even less must we believe it to be only possible 
provided we would have grounds to believe that we can be successful in latching onto 
reality) – it is just that which we as rational inquirers must see ourselves as striving towards. 
So even if we are doubtful that we will ever reach this ideal, this need not imply that we 
should not hold this up as our investigative norm.  
In a sense one could say that Friedman very seriously wants us to try to become Kant again: 
an impossible but maybe lofty dream!2 And this makes good sense of his appeal to the 
                                                 
2
 I also think that this is why Friedman, notwithstanding the pragmatist sounding invocation of an “ideal 
community of inquiry”, is trying to get at a position which is resolutely Kantian in a rather strong way rather 
than pragmatist (the latter tradition obviously has its own resources to try to deal with the kind of problems 
Friedman is addressing). As I try to indicate in my closing comments, this ultimately has to do with a view 
on the ethics of belief and inquiry – and more precisely with the role of autonomy therein.  
 necessary role of philosophy in making possible revolutionary but rational change, as this 
role is actually a modification of Kant’s original transcendental deduction into a 
necessarily inconclusive transcendental reflection. And as such reflection cannot but start 
from the (cognitive) situation we are in (as was already the case for Kant), it also makes 
good sense of the requirement that a new constitutive framework should necessarily evolve 
continuously from the older one. And finally, there is still a way in which we could see this 
as “progress”: we do actually learn something – not because we gain insight in the 
empirical structure of reality, and even less because we would gain insight in the 
transcendent structure of reality, but because we gain insight in how we do, and can, 
cognitively approach empirical reality. 
In this sense paradigm-change is both less and more than communicatively rational. It is 
less, because it is not objectivity-constituting (which it seems to be for Habermas, at least 
to be judged by the quote in Friedman 2001, 54; and which it certainly would have to be if 
it were linked to Kant’s or Cassirer’s regulative ideal); but it is more, because it does 
exemplify another deep feature of human rationality. We saw in Section 3.1 how a 
transcendental perspective unavoidably brings with it a distinction between things as they 
appear and things as they are in themselves. This was of the utmost importance to the 
Kantian project in that it curbs the pretensions of reason, and thus actually confronts it with 
its own responsibility – which is to grasp its (cognitive) autonomy. And this finally brings 
us back to Friedman’s curious invocation of responsibility besides (communicative) 
rationality. What the possibility of paradigm-change, and the concomitant historicization of 
reason shows is that the unavoidable contingency that characterizes our approach to reality 
runs even deeper than Kant could see: it not only depends on our being the kind of human 
beings we are, but also on the historical situation we always necessarily find ourselves in. 
But this only further highlights that we have no choice but to take full responsibility – 
which now also implies that we must be ready to question even our most cherished basic 
framework when situation demands it. And it is in this sense that we should see ourselves 
as approaching, and as necessarily only approaching, the ideal Kantian situation: because 
only thus can we fully uphold the ethical-cognitive ideal that is part and parcel of the 
 transcendental idealist stance. Only thus can “reason grow increasingly self-conscious and 
thereby take responsibility for itself.” 
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